3. Appointment of Ch 11 Trustee
4. Bad Faith Filing
5. Classification of Claims
6. Confirmation of Plan
7. Conversion of Ch 11 to Ch 7
8. New Value Exception and Absolute Priority Rule
9. Notice of Plan
11. Valuation for §1111(b) Purposes
12. Vote on Plan
13. Post Confirmation
In re Lee, 215 B.R. 22 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
Deed of trust that named certain appliances as part of security did not deprive mortgage lender of anti-modification protections.
In re Lievsay, 199 B.R. 705 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1149 (1998)
Boilerplate language in deed of trust does not take a residence out of anti-modification provision of 1123(b)
In re Gotcha International L.P. 311 B.R. 250 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004)
Appeal of confirmation order dismissed for equitable mootness, where debtor had obtained a refinance and distributed substantial payments to all but two classes.
In re Clarke, 98 B.R. 979 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989)
Once plan is substantially consummated, appeal is moot
3. Appointment of Ch 11 Trustee
In re Fred Lowenchuss, 171 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 877 (1999)
1. Ch 11 Trustee properly appointed
2. Notice and opportunity for hearing adequate
In re BIBO, Inc., 76 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996)
Court may appoint Chapter 11 trustee sua sponte.
4. Bad Faith Filing
In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1994)
Having found that case was filed in bad faith, court abused discretion in staying dismissal for 60 days.
In re St. Paul Self Storage Limited Partnership, 185 B.R. 580 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
No business, one asset, no employees, etc. = bad faith. Dismissal under § 1112(b) appropriate.
In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992)
Bad faith filing..sanctions Also Discovery Sanctions standard
In re Can-Alta Properties, Ltd., 87 B.R. 89 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988)
Bad faith filing.
5. Classification of Claims
In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997)
Separate class of deficiency claimants without a business or economic justification was not allowed. Separate classification of unsecured prepetition claims of trade creditors who were continuing to do business with debtor was also impermissible.
In re Montclair Retail Center, L.P., 177 B.R. 663 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
Separate classification of secured creditor’s claim had no reasonable justification. Johnson distinguished.
In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994)
(1) Separate classification of secured creditors’ deficiency claim was proper here, where claim was currently being litigated.
(2) Full present payment to senior creditors is required before payments to junior creditors may be permitted.
In re Commercial Western Finance Corp, 761 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985)
Secured creditors’ claims on different properties must be separately classified
6. Confirmation of Plan
In re Harbin, 486 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2007)
In determining the feasibility of a plan, the bankruptcy court “must evaluate the possible effect of a debtor’s ongoing civil case with a potential creditor, whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal.”
In re Associated Vintage Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 549 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
Confirmation of a chapter 11 liquidating plan did not terminate ability to object to a secured claim as being preferential under § 502(d). Doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply.
In re Allen, 300 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2002)
Chapter 11 plan which did not incorporate pre-confirmation § 362 stipulation and order was properly confirmed, where stipulation did not recite that it would be binding on the debtor in a chapter 11 plan.
Stratosphere Litigation L.L.C. v. Grand Casinos, Inc., 298 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2002)
Third party creditor was barred by res judicata from challenging bankruptcy court’s confirmation of debtor’s reorganization plan after party’s predecessor had previously failed to object
In re Wolfberg, 255 B.R. 879 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000), aff’d, 37 Fed.Appx. 891 (9th Cir. 2002)
Debtor’s attempt to assert a claim of homestead exemption after confirmation of a chapter 11 plan was barred by res judicata.
In re Consolidated Water Utilities, Inc., 217 B.R. 588 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)
Unsecured creditor who votes for reorganization plan cannot object when plan distribution does not include post-petition interest Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 1141(a), all parties to a confirmed plan are bound by its terms. A confirmation order is a binding, final order, to be accorded full res judicata effect. In re Heritage Hotel Partnership I, 160 B.R. 374, 377 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993). Aff’d without op., 59 F.3d 175 (9th Cir.1995). As long as due process is complied with, a confirmed plan binds all entities that hold a claim or interest, even if they are not scheduled, have not filed a claim, have not received a distribution under the plan or are not permitted to retain an interest under such plan, Id., A plan confirmation order precludes the raising of issues which could or should have been raised during the pendency of the case. Id. Trulis v. Barton, 67 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 1995) Confirmed Chapter 11 plan is res judicata as to all parties and questions.
In re Heritage Hotel Partnership, 160 B.R. 374 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993), aff’d. 59 F.3d 175 (9th Cir.1995)
Confirmation order of a plan which made no mention of lender liability suit acted as bar on
suit under res judicata.
7. Conversion of Ch 11 to Ch 7 or Chapter 13
In re Owens, 552 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2009)
Bankruptcy court properly dismissed rather than converting chapter 11 case that was filed in bad faith as a litigation tactic. Although conversion might have benefitted moving party, the best interests of all creditors must be considered in converting or dismissing a case. here, creditors might have fared worse in chapter 7 because the chapter 7 discharge would have deprived them of access to the debtor’s substantial future income.
In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2005)
“We hold that § 348(d) requires that postpetition employment tax debt, incurred as an administrative expense of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate, retains its first priority administrative expense status upon conversion to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Section 1305 is not in conflict with this holding because it does not govern the priority of the postpetition claims it allows into the bankruptcy.”
In re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage Entities, 264 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001)
Conversion from Chapter 11 to chapter 7 was warranted where corporation charge with responsibility for liquidating bankruptcy estate caused unreasonable delay by failing to account to investors.
In re Smith, 235 F.3d 472 (9th Cir.2000)
1) Under Rule 2003(e), a § 341 meeting must be adjourned to a specific time; 2) conversion of the case from chapter 11 to chapter 7 does not restart the running of the 30-day period for filing objections to exemptions.
In re Greenfield Drive Storage Park, 207 B.R. 913 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
Lapse of payments was material default under Chapter 11 plan that warranted conversion of case to Chapter 7
8. New Value Exception and Absolute Priority Rule
In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003)
1. Class that provided for nondischargeable debt to not receive distributions until litigation was complete, when other unsecured creditors were to receive earlier distributions, violated § 1123(a)(4); 2. Under limited circumstance, § 1141(d)(2) allows a plan to include a collection injunction, if plan provides for payment in full over time and the court has sufficient confidence that the plan is feasible; 3. misleading financial figures did not taint disclosure statement; 4. individual debtors are eligible for the new value exception to the absolute priority rule, but must prove the Bonner Mall test; 5.findings regarding good faith under § 1129(a)(3) were inadequate.
In re General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2001)
Following local union’s liquidation, parent union did not have equity interest in local for purposes of absolute priority rule solely by effect of provision in parent union’s constitution requiring local’s assets to escheat to parent for two years or until local reorganized.
In re Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. Partnership, 115 F.3d 650, 656-657 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998)
1. New value exception requires equivalence be contributed in cash or other present value, not notes. $320,000 held de minimus as a matter of law. Interest must be paid on unsatisfied debt where new value inadequate.
2. Discrimination between classes must satisfy four criteria to be considered fair under 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b): (1) the discrimination must be supported by a reasonable basis, (2) the debtor could not confirm or consummate the plan without the discrimination, (3) the discrimination is proposed in good faith, and (4) the degree of the discrimination is directly related to the basis or rational for the discrimination, In re Wolff, 22 B.R. 510, 511-12 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1982). Moreover, separate classification for the purpose of securing an impaired consenting class under §1129(a)(10) is improper See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991) cert. denied,, 506 U.S. 821 (1992) and cert. denied 506 U.S. 822 (1992), In re Holywell Corp. , 913 F.2d 873, 880, (11th Cir. 1990)
In re Dollar Associates, 172 B.R. 945 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (Carlson, J.)
Single asset real estate debtor is not permitted to confirm a “new value” plan where
property is over encumbered. Plan is not “fair and equitable” under § 1129(b)(1), even though it satisfies the “new value” exception to the absolute priority rule and may technically comply with § 1129(b)(2). Plan would not serve goals of reorganization and would undermine Bankruptcy Code restriction by reducing the creditor’s lien to court-determined value of collateral. Sun Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. SunWorld Corp (In re Sun Valley Newspapers, Inc.), 171 B.R. 71 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994) Following Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), motion to vacate denied and case dismissed, 513 U.S.
18 (1994), the B.A.P. has held that “cause” exists under § 362(d)(1) for relief from stay where debtor’s proposed “new value” plan is unconfirmable as a matter of law. After 13 months and the filing of three proposed plans, the debtor’s plan still had two fatal defects:
(1) it proposed to release insider guarantees in violation of § 524(e), and
(2) the contribution of old equity in consideration for retaining their ownership interest did not meet the new value tests of Bonner Mall. The insiders’ canceling their claim against the estate did not constitute new money or money’s worth necessary for reorganization, nor has the size of claim released reasonably equivalent in value to the retained equity interest.
Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)
Payment of unsecured claims in full over 67 months without interest, while debtor
retained some value. Was not fair and equitable and did not satisfy the absolute priority rule because unsecured creditors did not receive the full present value of their claims. Debtors in possession and their counsel have the duty to represent to the court that the plan satisfies the requirements of confirmation, so violation of the absolute priority rule may be raised on appeal although not argued in the trial court. Client is the estate, not the debtor individually, and counsel has an independent duty to determine whether an action will benefit the estate or merely cause delay.
In re Tucson Self Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
Unfair classification, unfair discrimination, absolute priority rule
(1) Classification based solely on the right to make § 1111(b) election was improper.
(2) 100% to trade and 10% to secured deficiency claim was unfair discrimination.
(3) Payment of $50,000 to debtor was a loan, not new value. Payment of promoters and administrative claimants was not a sufficient reason for new value.
In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir.1994)
Absolute priority rule not violated by permitting a debtor to retain rights in estate property under Chapter 11 plan
In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), motion to vacate denied and case
dismissed, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)
New value exception survives bankruptcy code when all pre-code requirements of
doctrine satisfied; if equity is retaining interest, must meet Bonner Mall test
In re Green, 98 B.R. 981 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989)
Plan calling for less than 100% payment and for debtor to retain 50% interest in lawsuit
violates absolute priority rule
9. Notice of Plan
In re Maya Construction, Inc., 78 F.3d 1395 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 862 (1996)
Where debtor knows of a potential claimant, debtor must list it and give notice. A failure
to do so may bar discharge of the debt. Case remanded to determine if creditor had adequate
notice of plan conf. but sat on his rights. Case may be important for what it says about unknown
In re Downtown Investment Club III, 89 B.R. 59 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988)
Failure to give general unsecured creditors notice of modified plan makes it void under
9024 and 1127 ‘material plan modifications require a formal disclosure statement and court
In re California Fidelity, Inc., 198 B.R. 567 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996)
§ 1125(b) – Solicitation without a disclosure statement – what constitutes a solicitation -
Jacobsen v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995)
1. § 1125(e) only provides a safe harbor for disclosure and solicitation. It does not
protect bad faith acts.
2. Forced sale doctrine of § 10(b)(5) has no applicability to a Chapter 11 reorganization.
In re Scioto Valley Mortg. Co., 88 B.R. 168 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)
§1125 – basic requirements of disclosure statements
11. Valuation for §1111(b) Purposes
In re Weinstein, 227 B.R. 284 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)
Bankruptcy court properly applied under secured bank’s statutory election to treat claim
as secured by ordering debtors to repay present value of collateral in 120 monthly payments
equaling secured and unsecured portions of bank’s claim. §1111(b)(2) option – Adequate
protection payments properly credited to secured, not unsecured claim.
In re Tuma, 916 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1990)
Creditor of corporation holding personal guaranty of debt could elect to have its claim
treated as secured. Valuation of stock.
In re California Hancock, Inc., 88 B.R. 226 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988)
Creditor was entitled to credit bid in sale pursuant to plan. §§ 1111(b) and 363(k).
12. Vote on Plan
In re Figter Limited, 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997)
Sole secured creditor of single-asset bankruptcy debtor does not per se act in bad faith by
acquiring and voting majority of unsecured claims to defeat proposed reorganization plan.
In re M. Long Arabians, 103 B.R. 211 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1989)
Failure to vote on plan does not constitute acceptance of plan
In re Federal Support Company, 859 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988)
Bad faith vote; fact that creditor was named as a defendant in debtor’s state antitrust case
did not show that creditor acted in bad faith in voting against reorganization plan.
13. Post Confirmation
In re J.J. Re-Bar Corp., Inc. 420 B.R. 496 (9th Cir. BAP 2009)
IRS could continue to pursue collection of trust fund taxes against the principals of the
debtor, since the debtor was not the “primary obligor” of such taxes as specified in the permanent
injunction provisions of the chapter 11 plan.
In re JZ L.L.C., 371 B.R. 412 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
Pursuant to section 1141(b), all property of the estate vests in the debtor upon
confirmation of the plan, regardless of whether it was listed in the bankruptcy schedules. Thus,
the debtor retains standing to control estate property after the case is closed.
In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2005)
Tort and breach of contract action brought post confirmation by debtor and newly-formed
corporation was within the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The “related to” test
was too broad in this context; rather, the inquiry was whether there was a close nexus to the
bankruptcy plan or proceeding.
General Electric Cap. v. Future Media Productions, 547 F.3d 956 (9th Cir 2008)
Where creditor’s oversecured claim was paid in full out of the proceeds of an asset sale,
rather than pursuant to a chapter 11 plan, and thus not subject to the “cure” provisions of § 1124
that a chapter 11 plan would allow, creditor was entitled to a default rate of interest. Court
distinguishes the holding in In re Entz-White Lumber and Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.
1988), and disapproves of the holding in In re Casa Blanca Project Lenders, 196 B.R. 140 (9th
Cir. BAP 1996)
In re Cooper Commons LLC, 512 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 2008)
Counsel for former debtor-in-possession was not entitled to compensation from a carve50
out negotiated by chapter 11 trustee for himself and his professionals, where the carve
out did not
include debtor-in-possession counsel, and debtor-in-possession counsel had previously waived
any entitlement to a carve-out.
Miller v. U.S, 363 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2004)
Res judicata did not apply to IRS claim, where the plan’s discharge provisions were found
to be ambiguous.
In re Dynamic Brokers, Inc., 293 B.R. 489 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003)
Appropriate interest rate is the rate “the debtor would pay a commercial lender for a loan
of equivalent amount and duration, considering the risk of default and any security.”
In re El Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503, 1504 (9th Cir.
1987). 6% for 240 months was appropriate in this case.
In re Silberkraus, 336 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003)
Fact that the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition only two days before a state court was to
schedule a trial date on a creditor’s claims for specific performance; the admissions by the debtor
and his counsel that reorganization was impossible over the objections of creditors; and the fact
that bankruptcy could not have provided more value to the debtor than proceeding with the state
court action support bankruptcy court’s finding that filing was frivolous and for an improper
In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1035 (2003)
Chapter 11 plan was proposed in good faith where the sole purpose was to enable debtors
to cure and reinstate an obligation, thereby avoiding contractual liability for default interest.
In re Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 282 B.R. 444 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
Bankruptcy court properly extended exclusivity period.
In re Southern Pacific Funding Corporation, 268 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2001)
Subordination clause in indenture agreement that preserved certain secured creditors’
rights both pre- and post- bankruptcy did not violate § 365(e)(1) of the bankruptcy code.
In re Crystal Properties, Ltd., 268 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001)
“Without notice or demand” provision in default interest clause of loan agreement did not
alter requirement that holder of defaulted loan must carry out some affirmative act to exercise its
option to accelerate the loan and invoke the default interest clause. Default interest rate did not
come into effect until holder of the note first took affirmative action to put the debtor on notice
that it intended to exercise its option to accelerate, and thus invoke the default rate.
Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2001)
Listing of prepetition “songrights” in a value of “unknown” “was not so defective that it
would forestall a proper investigation of the asset.” Accordingly, the right to post-petition
royalties from these assets vested in the debtor upon confirmation of his chapter 11 plan. Unpaid
prepetition royalties did not vest in the debtor, because they were subject to a separate listing
requirement as causes of action.
In re Hassen Imports Partnership, 256 B.R. 916 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)
1) Debtor was not entitled to attorney fees under CCP § 1717, since the dispute in
question was not an action on a promissory note, but an action on confirmation of a plan, which is
governed by federal bankruptcy law; 2) bankruptcy court erred in finding that secured creditor
was entitle to the default rate of interest in the note, since the creditor “failed to demonstrate that
the default rate reasonably compensated it for losses arising from the default;” 3) secured creditor
was entitled to fees under § 506(b)for pursuing collection of note from guarantors
In re Bartleson, 253 B.R. 75 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)
Because the chapter 11 plan did not contain a provision enjoining collection activity by
creditors with respect to their nondischargeable claims, creditors were not precluded from
pursuing their collection rights outside of the plan.
In re Fred Lowenchuss, 170 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1999) case 2
District Court properly vacated confirmation order where plan improperly excluded 8
million in assets.
Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434
Shareholders may be barred from putting up new money to retain ownership of company
following bankruptcy reorganization if others, including unsecured shareholders, were never
allowed to propose alternative plans.
In re Duvar Apt. Inc., 205 B.R. 196 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996)
Transfer to shell corporation raises presumption of bad faith.
In re Kelley, 199 B.R. 698 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996)
Vague references in plan and disclosure statement not sufficient to avoid res judicata on
counterclaims against secured creditor post-confirmation
In re Arnold and Baker Farms, 177 B.R. 648 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994), aff’d, 85 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054 (1997)
Partial transfer of collateral in full satisfaction of debt failed to give creditor indubitable
equivalent of secured claim.
In re Antiquities of Nevada, Inc., 173 B.R. 926 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
Debtor may not modify reorganization plan after fulfilling applicable statutory
requirements to substantially consummate plan.
In re Hotel Associates of Tucson, 165 B.R. 470 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
Motive in creating an impaired class is irrelevant.
In re Boulders on the River, Inc., 164 B.R. 99 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
In this single asset, 100% plan:
(1) Converting construction financing to permanent with 25 year amortization and 7 year
balloon was okay.
(2) No bad faith under § 1129(a)(3).
(3) 9% blended rate for cramdown interest was okay.
I.R.S. v. Creditors’ Committee (In re Deer Park, Inc.), 10 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993)
Bankruptcy court confirmed liquidating Chapter 11 plan that sold all debtor’s assets and
distributed proceeds. Plan erroneously listed I.R.S. tax claim at $20,000 less than actual claim.
amount. When shortfall was discovered, creditors’ committee moved to modify plan to require
I.R.S. to first apply payments to the “trust fund” taxes for which debtor’s president was personally
liable under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6672 and 7501. Motion granted and affirmed under authority of United
States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545 (1990). (Chapter 11 reorganization plan could
require I.R.S. to allocate payments first to trust fund taxes even though this increased risk to
I.R.S. that non-trust fund taxes may not be paid.) Held: Liquidation may be a form of
reorganization and the continued participation of debtor’s president in a planned liquidation may
be necessary to maximize recovery for creditors.
In re L&J Anaheim Assoc., 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993)
Creditor plan which requires property to be sold through bankruptcy trustee impairs
creditor since it deprives him of state law contract rights, even if it enhances his position.
In re Wheeler Technology, Inc., 139 B.R. 235 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992)
Bankruptcy court has no power to remove a creditor from a creditor’s committee
In re Orange Tree Assoc., Ltd., 961 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1992) §1144
Must file complaint to revoke within 180 days of confirmation order, not order modifying
Hay v. First Interstate Bank or Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992)
Debtor barred from suing post-confirmation when it knew facts preconfirmation.
Great Western Bank v. Sierra Woods Group, 953 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1992)
Fairness of a plan that includes “negative amortization” (see § 1129) must be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
Official Committee of the Unsecured Creditors of White Farm Equipment Company v. United
States, 111 B.R. 158 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reversed, 943 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 919 (1992)
I.R.S. property tax discharged in first Chapter 11, making I.R.S. general unsecured
creditor in second Chapter 11.
In re Mann Farms, Inc., 917 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1990)
Where state court determination of lawsuit will not affect plan of reorganization, right is
not preempted by plan.
In re Grimes, 117 B.R. 531 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990)
Chapter 12 filing not prohibited while Chapter 11 plan not substantially consummated.
In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1990)
Reorganization cramdown rate using market formula approach must consider risk factors
as well as rates for similar loans in the area. See also In re Camino Real Maintenance
Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987).
In re Lenox, 902 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1990)
(1) Remand was warranted for bankruptcy court to take evidence as to feasibility of plan,
(2) on remand, court was to enforce stipulation unless it found special circumstances
justified course of action necessary to save farm and, if so, was to adopt measures that would give
creditors the interest and principal which, under stipulation, they would have had by date loan
was to be made current and was to shorten payment period under plan so that creditors could be
repaid in 15 years rather than 23.
In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990)
Plan impermissibly enjoined creditors from suing co-debtors
in absence of objection, court has no obligation to inquire into plan
In re Southeast Company, 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989)
§ 1124(2). Debtor’s right to cure default includes right to reinstate nondefault lower